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Information and Philosophy 
Some preliminary remarks 
Information is not a traditional philosophical term. In Scholastic philos-
ophy the word "informatio" is sometimes used as meaning "the process of 
giving a form to matter". In Modern philosophy the word has mostly dis-
appeared and, in the sense of communication, it never had a philosophical 
meaning. Indexes to the works of philosophers such as Descartes, Spinoza, 
Burne and Hegel do not even mention the word. Also the philosophical 
dictionaries of Eisler, Lalande and Baldwin seem to regard only the Scholas-
tic meaning as a philosophical one. Considering that the processes connected 
with the receiving and transmitting of information belong to the most 
important human activities, we cannot but be surprised by this situation. 
It is true, of course, that part of the problems related to information is 
treated under the heading of such concepts as perception, knowledge, intel-
ligence, experience, learning, and language, but it is clear that, in this way, 
the aspects these notions have in common were neglected. 
During the last fifteen years this situation has apparently changed. We 
do not have in mind the works of philosophers who use the word in its com-
mon sense meaning. A typical example of them would be Bertrand Russell, 
who makes frequent use of it 1 apparently without considering it as a philo-
sophical term; symptomatic of this is his not giving a definition of it and 
his not mentioning it in the index to his work. We are more interested in 
works such as those of Wiener, Ruyer, Bonsacq, Costa de Beauregard and 
others, who doubtlessly use the word with philosophical import. 2 At any 
rate, in their expositions they explore areas which traditionally belong to 
the realm of philosophical inquiry, in which their objects are, for example, 
the theory of knowledge and the notions of structure, order, form and organ-
ization. 
1 e.g. RUSSELL, B., Human knowledge, its scope and limits; pp. 71-77. 
2 BONSACQ, F., Information, Thermodynamique, Vie et Pensee. Paris, 1961, 
COSTA DE BEAUREGARD, 0., Le second Principe de la Science du Temps. Entropie, 
Information, Irreversibilite. Paris, 1963. 
RUYER, R., La Cybernetique et l'Origine de l'In/ormation. Paris, 1954. 
WIENER, N., The human Use 0/ human Beings. Boston, 1954. 
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Considering this growing interest in the concept of information, it is 
surprising that few attempts have been made to give it an exact and general 
definition. There are some who, like Russell, neglect the problem of defini-
tion entirely; others, like Colin Cherry, doubt the possibility of arriving 
at an exact definition or, like S.S. Stevens, hold that each science demands 
of this word a specific definition peculiar to that science. Still others main-
tain that the concept of information needs no definition, the measure of in-
formation containing all its meaningful aspects. 3 Wiener and Ruyer offer 
somewhat vague definitions which, nevertheless, present some important 
aspects 4. A more serious attempt at definition has been made by Mackay; 
he however considers only what we could call "man-to-man information" 
and does not deal with communication of information, neither from man to 
machine nor from machine to machine. 5 
We agree with Wiener, however, that it makes sense to talk about infor-
mation in connection with machines as well as with men. 6 Consequently, it 
is our intention in this paper to give a definition that will be broad enough 
to cover all these forms of information and, at the same time, to indicate 
the aspects these different forms have in common. 
In rebuttal to Wilkinson, who has remarked that to distinguish "informa-
tion" from "quantity of information" is meaningless, we might point out 
first that information is always regarded as something which is communi-
cated, so that the question may be asked how this communication process 
happens and in what way it differs from other forms of communication 
such as communication of calories in metabolism. Besides this question 
of what is information, another possible question is how one bit of informa-
tion, one communication, can differ from another. Apparently, the notion 
of "quantity of information" will provide us with no answer to the first 
question: the measure of a thing does not tell us what it is. 7 As to the sec-
3 "Our strictly operational view of this measure makes it meaningless to distinguish 
between information and quantity of information" WILKINSON, J., The concept of informa-
tion and the unity of science. Phil. of Science, XXVIII, (1961), pp. 406-413. 
4 "L'information au sens ordinaire du mot est la transmission a un eire conscient d'une 
signification, d'une notion, par Ie moyen d'un message plus ou moins conventionnel et par 
un pattern spatio-temporel ... " RUYER, O.c. p. 7 
"Information is a name for the content of what is exchanged with the outer world as 
we adjust to it, and make our adjustment felt upon it." WIENER, o.c. p. 17. 
"Messages are themselves a form of pattern and organisation", WIENER, O.C. p. 21. 
5 MACKAY, D.M., Operational aspects of some fundamental concepts of human communi-
cation. Synthese, IX, pp. 182-189. 
6 "It is my thesis that the physical functioning of the living individual and the operation 
of some of the newer communication machines are precisely parallel in their analogous 
attempts to control entropy through feed-back". WIENER, o.c. p. 26. 
7 "It is always important to distinguish between a physical property (attribute, quality) 
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ond question, it seems also that the quantity of information provides no 
criterion for distinguishing between communications. Upon the birth of 
his child Mr. Jones can give us two kinds of messages, e.g. "1" (it is a boy) 
or "0" (it is a girl) ; because these messages are equally probable, each mes-
sage has the same quantity according to the selective information measure 
(Shannon). Nevertheless, these are two different communications. 
Against the objection that communication between machines and com-
munication between men cannot be compared because there is too great a 
difference of level between them, we can put forward that an attempt at 
comparison is more representative of a scientific attitude than is the a priori 
statement that a comparison is impossible. Moreover, in the study of very 
complicated forms of communication such as perception and language, it 
may be very useful to start from a more simple level and to search whether 
it is possible to reduce the more complicated forms to the simple ones. 
The general definition, whose composition is the purpose of this paper, 
will not be a purely formal one based on axioms, but rather will initially 
draw from the everyday usage of this term, for we hope that this usage can 
teach us something about the essential features of information. 
It is typical of the pre-analytical usage of language that we employ the 
same word for a set of partly different objects without being conscious of 
why we denote them by the same name. Moreover, it is a fact that for some 
objects we know without any doubt that they belong to a given class and 
for others that they do not. In many cases, however, there remains a num-
ber of objects of whose classification we are uncertain. Our method of analy-
sis will be such that we will begin with one large class, which is determined 
by a small number of criteria and to which all objects to be studied certainly 
belong. Further, by comparing subclasses of this head class, it will be possible 
to us to establish new criteria until we can determine with certainty the 
limits of the class to be· defined. It is evident that the meaning of this word 
resulting from the final definition will be somewhat different from the pre-
analytical meaning (by virtue of its greater clarity, for example). Moreover 
in selecting the criteria there is a certain degree of free choice. A right 
choice will be one which permits us to deal with a greater number of prob-
lems. 
Following this method, we will begin our investigation by stating that all 
forms of emitting and receiving information can be subsumed under the 
general notion of influence, either of a system upon its surroundings or vice 
versa. 
and a measure, unit, or magnitude of that property." CHERRY, On human Communication 
London, 1957. p. 10 
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We speak of systems because we wish our definition to be as general as 
possible. To realise our objective, it is not necessary to give an exact defini-
tion of "system", although we are of the opinion that it is possible to arrive 
at such a definition through set-theoretical and topological means. We 
will use this word in an intuitive way as is mostly done in cybernetics and 
physics. Describing it more precisely, we might say that by "system" is 
meant every set of elements which, by some physical, chemical, or like 
features, forms a certain unity which is distinguishable from its surroun-
dings. 
We can distinguish first an absolutely isolated system, which has no inter-
action with its surroundings; it is clear that such a system exists only as an 
abstraction. Next to be considered is an unisolated system, viz. a system 
which, over its whole surface, is subject to interaction with its surroundings. 
Examples of such systems are rocks, planets, clouds etc. Finally we consider 
a relatively isolated system, viz. a system "which is influenced by the rest 
of the Universe, but only in certain specified ways called inputs, and influen-
ces the rest of the Universe but only in certain specified ways called out-
puts." 8 Living organisms and machines can be considered as such relatively 
isolated systems. By influence we mean every factor bringing about a 
change either in the system itself or in its relations with the surroundings. 
Not all forms of influence can be called information. There are, for exam-
pIe, forces which work upon the system as a whole, viz. changing its loca-
tion, or heating or destroying it. Let us call these global influences. Exam-
ples of such influences are all kinds of radiation, gravitation, magnetism, 
pushing and pulling. In everyday language no one refers to information in 
connection with global influences. A locomotive pulling a train gives no 
information to it, not does a boxer who knocks out his opponent. It is typi-
cal for global influences that they have an immediate effect and show an 
aspect of interaction, e.g. the "action and reaction" in mechanical processes 
and the changes of entropy in heating processes. It should also be stressed 
that all forms of influence, regardless of how small they may be, always 
possess in some way this global feature. To be distinguished from global in-
fluences are local influences, i.e. factors bringing about a change in the sys-
tem only through the inputs, and in the surroundings only through the 
outputs. 
Of course, these local influences can only exist in connection with relatively 
isolated systems. 'Vith closer examination, we see that these systems trans-
form the energy supplied to them from one form to another, and they are of-
ten capable of storing energy (e.g. batteries of cars, glycogen reserves in the 
8 efr. GRENIEWSKI, H., Cybernetics without mathematics, London, 1961. pp. 9-10. 
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human body). These systems do not necessarily react immediately as in 
the case of global influences. Since in most cases a particular input or out-
put can receive or emit only one particular form of energy, distinguishable 
states of the inputs (outputs) are varied only according to the amount of 
energy involved. A system with local influences, which can transform ener-
gy (i.e. the form of energy of the input is different from that of the output) 
or store it (i.e. the amount of energy at the output is not a function of the 
amount at the input at a given moment) will be called an energy-system or 
E-system. Besides these E-systems there exist other relatively isolated 
systems which can transform or store matter. Such are systems which 
change the external form, the physical state, the chemical or atomic struc-
ture of the input matter (e.g. grinding, evaporation, cristallisation ... ). 
In many cases this transformation is accompanied by a process of sorting 
by which the output matter is classified according to some criteria. Let us 
call these systems which transform or store matter matter systems or M-
systems. 
It is evident that in practice it is difficult to make a clear distinction 
between E-systems and M-systems. Because energy is necessary in every 
transformation of matter almost all M-systems have energy inputs. More-
over, in many E-systems energy is supplied or stored in the form of matter 
(A steam engine transforms coal into movement; energy is stored in the 
body as glycogen.) 
Consequently, the criteria that we use in distinguishing E-systems from 
M-systems can be determined only by our interest. When we make use of 
only the energy ouput as is the case for a steam or gas engine, we will speak 
of an E-system. When we make use of only the matter output, as is the 
case for all systems which sort or act upon matter, e.g. mills, then we will 
speak of M -systems. 
Besides these E- and M -systems there are others we consider to be both 
E- and M-systems, because their energy in- and output as well as their mat-
ter in- and output are of interest to us. Living beings are examples of such 
complex systems. Food ingested contains components to be transformed 
into matter, (e.g. tissue), and into energy, (e.g. movement and heat). It 
must be said that living beings are a very special case: because the most 
important E- and M-transformations are used primarily for the growth 
and maintenance of the system itself, the significance of the outputs is not 
so great as in artificial E-and M -systems. 
As previously mentioned, information can be only a local influence. 
A system which can receive, store, transform, or emit information-in 
short an information-system or I-system-must be either an E- or an M-
system. 
10 
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Not all local influences, however, are regarded as information: the food 
of living beings, the fuel which makes a motor run, the electrical current 
which keeps an apparatus working, are never called information. This is 
equally true of the labour a machine performs (movement), and of electric 
current out of a dynamo. Thus, we must establish further criteria that will 
enable us to distinguish I-systems from ordinary E- and M-systems. Because 
the examination of M-systems is hardly relevant to our study, we will look 
to E-systems in "Jrder to find the difference between an ordinary energy in-
fluence and information. 
To aid us in our search we will examine again everyday usage of language. 
In general one speaks of information when referring to the influences which 
men undergo through language or through the senses. A concrete example 
of such influence is presented by the system "chauffeur of a car", who sees 
traffic signals and reacts to them with certain movements of hands and 
feet. This is a very simple system because the reactions depend directly 
on the observations and there is no stage of storing. He has certain energy 
influences for its input (light streams) and for its output (movements of 
the steering wheel, gas and brake pedals). He will stop on red and move 
on green; intuitively we accept that what the light signals supply him is 
information. What then is essential in distinguishing such a system from 
a usual E-system? We contend that the essential characteristic of I-systems 
is that in them there exists a one-to-one relation between the distinguishable 
states of the input and those of the output, as exemplified by "red-stop" 
and "green-go".!) In ordinary E-systems there can also be a one-to-one 
relation between states of the input and states of the output, but here a 
change of state of the output will be determined by the quantity of energy 
at the input, whereas in I-systems the relation between the quantities of 
energy is not necessarily significant, because any one-to-one relation is suf-
ficient to realize an I-system. In other words, it is not the quantity but the 
form which is the important factor. By a form of the input we understand 
a distinguishable state of the input. Once there are two distinguishable 
states, it is possible to form an infinite number of complex distinguishable 
states by combining those two elementary states: with a series of n conse-
cutive states it is possible to form 2n complex distinguishable states. By 
extension we can also give the name form to such a complex distinguishable 
state. A further extension of this notion is found in the case of many simul-
taneous inputs, each with at least two distinguishable states. 
9 Since no actually existing system is perfect, this definition is to be considered as an 
abstraction. The one-to-one relation between input and output is an ideal which is ap 
proached as much as possible. 
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We can now define an I-system as a system in which the output is depen-
dant on the lorm of the input. Still another extension of the notion of form 
provides us with a definition of information: an energy influence with a 
certain lorm, i.e. which causes an input of an information system to take 
a distinguishable state. 
Every communication of information will thus always have an energy 
current as substratum. The consecutive states of the input can be continu-
ous; in such a case we speak of analogous information. The states of the 
input can also be discontinuous; then we speak of digital information. 
An E-system can be used as an analogous I-system, because in most cases 
there is a correspondence of form between output and input, viz. when 
the amount of energy in the output is a function of the energy of the 
input. (Variations in quantity can be looked upon as variations in form). 
In this way a wind mill, which is an E-system, can also be used as an 1-
system to provide information about wind velocity. One can, however, 
speak only of information if the difference in form is used effectively. Dif-
ferent criteria can be established to ascertain whether the form aspect is 
preserved. One of the most important criteria is that when the form aspect 
is preserved, it ordinarily will be amplified. Further, if the system possesses 
a reservoir, it is mostly easy to determine whether the form is preserved 
in the storing process. In a usual E-system, one cannot know in what form 
the energy has been stored since the quantity of energy at the output is 
determined by the system which uses it, whereas in I-systems the form is 
preserved since the output influence cannot be altered by the system making 
use of it. The energy of a car battery, for example, can be unloaded in 
various ways not dependant on the manner in which it was charged: on 
the contrary, a record can be played on a phonograph in only one way, 
the one in which it was recorded (in this case at the same speed). A final 
method of distinguishing E- from I -systems is to examine the influence 
of noise. In E-systems noise does not significantly disturb the usage of the 
output; it can merely retard it. In I-systems, however, its influence is far 
greater: it can make the usage of the output impossible. 
One should not think that only highly complex forms of energy, such as 
air vibrations, radio waves, or electric current, can be used as bearers of 
information. I t is equally possible to transmit information by mechanical 
means, since it is sufficient to establish a one-to-one relation between some 
states of input and output. Watt's regulator for steam engines is an example 
of such a mechanical device. 
Thus we can say that with I-systems there exists a one-to-one relation 
between states of the input and states of the output. The fact that a definite 
series of states of the output correspon ds to a definite series of states of the 
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input, we can express by saying that the output reacts to the form of the 
input. Since these states stand in a one-to-one relation with some states 
of the energy stream which influences the input, we can also say that the 
output reacts to the form of the energy stream, i.e. to its distinguishable 
states. (This notion of distinguishable state must be seen in relation to a 
receiving apparatus: an energy stream can have a class of states which 
are distinguishable by one receiving apparatus and not by another). 
Since a criterion for I -systems is the preserving of the form of the energy-
stream, the notion of information will be closely related to the notion of 
form. Hence our first attempt at defining information will be to say that 
it is a local energy influence which takes a certain form. 10 
With this definition as the point of departure, we encounter the following 
difficulty: when an energy influence has a certain form which has not yet or 
cannot be detected, can we consider it then a bearer of information or only 
after the employment of a detecting apparatus? 
Here it is useful to make a distinction between communicated information 
and observed information. We speak of communicated information when 
the form of an energy stream that influences an input B corresponds to the 
form of the output A of another system. Therefore it is necessary that be-
fore the communication, there existed a one-to-one relation between the 
class of states of output A and those of input B (e.g. our chauffeur cannot 
react meaningful to traffic lights if the relation "red-stop, green-go" has 
not been previously established). We will call the system with output A a 
transmitter and the system with input B a receiver. In this case we can cer-
tainly say that the energy influence is always a bearer of information be-
cause in principle the form can be detected. When there is no longer a re-
ceiver (a telegraph office which is destroyed, inscriptions which cannot be 
deciphered) this poses no problem, for at any rate, there is in principle a one-
to-one relation between the transmitter and a well defined receiver, although 
the latter does not exist actually. 
We speak of observed information when the form of the energy stream 
that influences an input has no correspondence to the form of the output 
of another system; together with this stands the fact that observation is 
not dependant on a preestablished one-to-one relation. Examples of this 
observed information are all kinds of radiation emitted by systems such 
as the sun and the stars, also mechanical influences which act upon inputs, 
and thus all natural phenomena of which our senses or instruments can 
10 Since the form is the important aspect, it will be clear that the same description can 
be given in connection with M-systems. Consequently, we can say also that information 
is every local influence which has a form. 
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detect distinguishable states. Here we can say that the energy stream be-
comes a bearer of information as soon as a one-to-one relation is established 
between forms of the energy stream and forms of the input of an I-system. 
The philosophical viewpoint called Realism admits that the states of an 
energy stream correspond to different states of objects or systems which 
emit it. For this reason, one says that the energy stream gives in/ormation 
about an object, as the sun-rays give information about the sun. 
Acoording to our definitions, the statement "The system I receives infor-
mation about object 0" means nothing other than "there is a one-to-one 
relation between certain states (classes of states) of 0 and certain states of 
the input of I; this one-to-one relation is established via certain forms of 
energy stream E (E being a local influence of 0 and I)." Also, it is presup-
posed that 0 did not have a one-to-one relation with I prior to the influence. 
We can, of course, receive information also about the energy stream itself. 
Such is the case when we establish a relation between I and E only and not 
between I and the emitting object 0, e.g., when the object is not known 
(cosmic rays) or is not the subject of examination (the study of light phenom-
ena). 
The statement "a system I" receives information from a system I'''means 
nothing other than "(1) there is a one-to-one relation (established by a local 
influence) between states of the input of I" and states of the output of I', 
and (2) the states of the output of I I are themselves related to the states of 
the input of I'." Consequently the system I' only conveys the form of an E-
stream and is not the origin of it. The origin of the form of an E-stream, i.e. 
the origin of a communication, is always found in a state of a system or an 
object. This state effects and determines a certain form of an E-stream, and 
this form of an E-stream makes the input of an I-system assume a definite 
state. 
From this viewpoint the question of the "origin of information" appears 
to us to be no great problem. Observed information always originates in' a 
state of an object which can emit an energy stream; communicated informa-
tion originates in an I-system which conveys observed informatioIl. This sim-
ple scheme can, of course, become exceedingly complicated because of the 
capacity of some I-systems to store the results of observations and to mani-
pulate them in a variety of ways and also because of the possibility of compar-
ing information received from different objects. Further, I-systems can 
systematically induce changes of forms; consequently, partly information 
from and partly information about the system will be received. Finally, the 
form of the E-stream can be altered by a great number of independant fac-
tors. In this case it may become very difficult to reestablish the one-to-one 
relation with the original information (or form). In referring to such situa-
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tions, one ordinarily speaks of noise and systematic noise. It is generally 
said that information is lost through this process. This way of speaking 
can lead to confusion. Firstly, the energy stream always possesses a well 
determined form which brings about a well determined state in the input; 
in this sense the input always receives information, i.e. a one-to-one relation 
is established between the E-stream and the input. That which alone can 
be lost is the one-to-one relation between the input of the receiving system 
and the output of the transmitting system or the emitting object. If noise 
appears either in a transmitting system or in the stream itself, i.e. if a chan-
ge of form takes place, nothing happens but a substitution of one or more 
new objects for the original. Instead of representing the state of one object, 
the E-stream then represents the state of a complex of objects and systems. 
This new state of the E-stream is a possible state selected from such a great 
class that it is impossible to establish a one-to-one relation with this extreme-
ly complex class of states. This means that the E-stream provides us no 
longer with information about this complex of objects, but only about the 
E-stream itself. Between those two extreme cases (a one-to-one relation 
between forms of the input and states of a determined object, and the 
absolute impossibility of determining an object) one can have forms of E-
streams which are mainly determined by one object or system and partly 
by other influences. One can say that here the ideal of a one-to-one relation 
is approached. The degree of approximation to a one-to-one relation be-
tween the emitted or transmitted and the received E-stream can be called the 
quantity of information of an E-stream about an object or about the output 
of a system; this quantity Shannon calls the transinformation. Much con-
fusion could have been avoided had the notion of quantity of information 
been limited to this transinformation. 
N ow one can ask what is the function of I-systems and of information. 
E-systems are used to transform or store energy so that it can be employed 
when and where it is needed; it is clear that one of the fundamental require-
ments is that as much as possible the quantity of energy is maintained. On 
the contrary, we find that in I -systems the quantity plays no significant part, 
since the one-to-one relation is the determinant factor. Consequently, the 
transformations performed by an I-system can be of various kinds: 
(1) form variations of a weak energy stream can be transformed into form 
variations of a strong energy stream and thus can be made perceptible 
to other systems (e.g. amplification of electrical current) ; 
(2) variations of very strong energy streams can be transformed into weaker 
streams, which again make them perceptible to other systems without 
destroying them (e.g. various forms of measuring instruments, for high 
voltages or temperatures) ; 
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(3) variations of an energy stream can be transformed into variations of 
another energy form (e.g. electrical energy into mechanical energy) which 
makes possible the control of all kinds of steering mechanisms; 
(4) the form aspect can be preserved in a reservoir which permits storage 
of the perceptions and regulations just mentioned and their recall at any 
moment; 
(5) the results of a transformation can be such that the variations of form 
can be transmitted accurately over great distances; 
(6) energy or matter variations can be multiplied infinitely so that they 
can be used at any place or time for perceptions and regulations. 
As soon as an energy stream is transformed in one of these six ways, anrl 
thus the form aspect is actually being used, we shall call it an information-
bearing stream in the strict sense of the word. The systems which perform 
one of those transformations are I-systems, while systems in which the form 
aspect is lost are ordinary E-systems ; the energy stream received by E-sys-
tems we will not consider as information-bearing, although in most cases 
it potentially is. 
As has been noticed, amplification processes take place in a great number 
of actually existing I-systems. -This is easily understandable since amplifi-
cation is often indispensable in making weak energy currents mechanically 
useful and even in making them perceptible. Furthermore, this amplifica-
tion is also necessary to transmit form variations over great distances. On 
the basis of these remarks one is inclined to think that the amplification 
is the outstanding characteristic of information and that all reception of 
information is accompanied by one or another form of amplification. All 
I-systems then would be amplifiers. 
An interesting study following this trend of thought was presented by 
G. Simondon at the Colloques philosophiques de Royaumont, 1962. He 
starts from the principle that a system must be in a state of metastability 
to be able to receive information, i.e. that there is a high potential energy 
which can be released by a small quantity of energy: the information. Here 
he considers two fundamental forms of amplification. Transductive ampli-
fication (amplification transductive) can be found, for example, in saturated 
solutions; by adding a small crystal (information), the metastable state is 
changed into a stable one through a process which extends in all directions. 
Transduction occurs also when a spark ignites a quantity of explosives and 
when an impulse traverses nerve fibres. 
The notion of transductive amplification he uses as a model for psycho-
social processes such as the spreading of rumours. The essential mark of 
this mode of propagation is the necessity of a certain recovery time before 
a metastable state can be established. For a nerve fibre this recovery time 
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is 1/1000 sec, for psycho-social phenomena it may be weeks or even years. 
Moreover, there is also modulating amplification (amplification modulatrice), 
the typical example of which is the triode. Here we have a constant power 
supply at the cathode. By emission of electrons a current flow to the anode 
through a grid, and small voltage changes in the grid cause important cor-
responding variations of the current which flows from cathode to anode. A 
strong current is thus controlled or modulated by a weak one. This mode 
of amplification occurs frequently and, as a matter of fact, the maj ority 
of the energy streams which are called information are used to control 
energy in this way. Finally Simondon examines a synthesis of both those 
forms: the organizing amplification (amplification organisante). According 
to his exposition, the transductive amplification shows a characteristic of 
direction and by that fact brings about a progressive change of structure in 
its working area; it has, however, a passing and unstable feature. The mo-
dulating amplification possesses a stable character: the regulation here is 
excellent but not progressive; the aspect of change in structure is lacking. 
The organizing amplification is a mixture of these two types of amplifica-
tion and must be looked upon as a regulated change in structure. This or-
ganizing amplification we find in the evolutionary processes of living beings 
and in the changes of regulating structures in society. 
Although his insights into the three modes of amplification which pro-
vide models of some psychic, biological and psycho-social phenomena are 
of great interest to us, still we question whether it is wise to consider those 
processes as the pre-eminent information processes. Firstly, in considering 
transductive amplification as an informative process, Simondon deviates 
from the everyday usage of language. To regard a quantity of explosives as 
a system which receives information from a spark, seems to us an extreme 
extension of the notion of information, since such. a system can receive 
that information only once, due to its being destroyed by it. In this way 
every flammable systeme would receive information from a flame because 
a transductive burning process occurs. Likewise every object which is in a 
metastable state with respect to gravitation (e.g. a rock on the top of a hill) 
would receive information from a push which forces it out of the metastable 
state. 
This conception deviates in two ways from that which we offer. Firstly 
we wish to speak of information not in connection with all kinds of objects 
or systems, but only in connection with relatively isolated systems (systems 
with input and output), for we desire a notion of information applicable to 
living beings and machines. Any further extension of this notion would 
lead to many complications. Everyone may, of course, choose his own cri-
teria, but there remains the question of how to describe most clearly the 
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phenomena. Secondly, we consider only local influences as information, 
while Simondon seems to include also in his concept some global influences 
such as destruction or a total change of structure. 
Weare not even sure that psycho-social phenomena such as spreading 
of rumours take place in a metastable state, unless this notion is extended 
so much as to include the spreading of diseases by microbes and viruses. 
With respect to the modulation amplification we agree fully that in a 
great number of cases the steering character of information is very impor-
tant, and that often energy streams bearing information must be amplified. 
Is it, however, true that this amplification element is so essential? Is it 
not rather true that the correspondence of form is the fundamental charac-
teristic of which amplification indeed is a frequent example? Not every 
transformation, however, needs to be an amplification. In a loudspeaker, 
for example, the electrical current coming from the amplifier is transformed 
into sound waves without amplification; in the primitive magnet telephone 
the sound waves were transformed into electrical current, also without 
amplification. According to our viewpoint information is here also trans-
mitted, although it is not being amplified. The magnet telephone is an 1-
system just as is our modern telephone, in which modulation amplification 
does take place. Everyone agrees that by amplification the possibilities 
of manipulating information have been greatly expanded, but in principle 
this is only an extension of the ability to establish form-correspondences. 
Summarizing we may say that we call information any local influence 
which has a certain form, provided that this form is used. The use of the 
form includes that this influence is received by an I-system. An I-system 
is a relatively isolated system which is able to transmit, transform, or store 
form. In an ideal I-system there exists a one-to-one relation between the 
form (the distinguishable state) of the input and the form of the output. 
Although many I-systems are amplifiers, the amplifation is to be regarded 
as but one out of many possible form manipUlations. In this context we 
can say also that one communication differs from another in the fact that 
it is another form of a local influence and so corresponds to another state 
of the input, and refers to another state of the emitting or transmitting 
system. 
Since the purpose of this study was to define this notion of information, 
the reader may ask himself why it is entitled "Information and Philosophy". 
Our original intention was to deal with some philosophical problems related 
to the notion of information. We realized, however, that it would immedia-
tely lead to confusions to work with a concept the meaning of which is vague 
and nebulous in everyday speech, and even in some scientific works. In 
order to establish a more precise definition it was necessary to define some 
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auxiliary notions. So, in stead of dealing intensively with strict philosophi-
cal problems this study developed into being a mere introduction. 
Among the problems we wish to examine in another paper is that of the 
origin of information. It is our intention to criticise the opinion of Ruyer 
a.o., for whom this origin seems to be something mysterious. As we have 
already mentioned, according to us, in principle, this problem is not so 
complicated; but it will be more difficult to show how, in practice, obser-
ved information is transformed into communicated information. In the same 
context it will be also necessary to examine the relation between our concept 
of form on one hand, and the meaning of this word in everyday speech 
and the notions of order and structure on the other hand. 
There is another class of problems we hope to study with this definition 
as starting point, viz. all those related to the concepts of meaning denota-
tion and truth. Our first notion will be that of pragmatic meaning; the 
pragmatiC meaning of a form of an input being the reaction (the state of 
the output) it causes. In other words~ the pragmatic meaning of a communi-
cation is the use the system makes of it. In the language of bees, for exam-
ple, the pragmatic meaning of a certain dance is nothing else than a well 
defined trip to the food which is induced by it. Next to this pragmatic 
meaning we will have to consider semantic meaning. It will be a very diffi-
cult task to explain how it is possible that some systems can receive seman..;. 
tic information. A form of an input has semantic meaning when it refers 
to the state of the system which causes this form (via the form of a local 
influence). Semantic meaning in the case of the dance of bees would be a 
certain idea which it elicits in them, viz. an idea of food in such direction, 
at such distance. Of course it is problematic whether the dance of bees has 
such semantic meaning, but this example demonstrates that the distinction 
with pragmantic meaning can be made. 
Once we have come to an explanation of the origin of information, as well 
as of the transition from pragmatic to semantic information, we would like 
to show how the notions defined by us are related to the concept of quantity 
of information. The importance of this concept varies according to the 
kind of system one is talking about. We can have to do with learning and 
non-learning systems in the case of pragmatic information, and with systems 
which construct a model of their world in the case of semantic information. 
In pointing out the relation which exists between quantity of information 
and the kind of systems which receive it, we hope to understand better in 
which degree the uncertainty of messages has a subjective and an objective 
character. 
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